Apartment Finance
TodaySPECIAL FOCUSWALL STREET AT A CROSSROADS Out
of the AshesAPARTMENT FINANCE TODAY • July/August 2008 Column
Financial's Kieran Quinn is working to spark a revival in the conduit lending
business. BY BENDIX ANDERSON and JERRY ASCIERTO
The conduit lending business has a very faint pulse. Few new loans are being originated,
and the flow of Wall Street money, the lifeblood of the conduit business, has
slowed to a trickle. But like the mythical phoenix rising from its ashes,
the market for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) has slowly begun its
resurrection. Column Financial and Goldman Sachs, two major originators
of multifamily conduit loans, have reopened their shops, trumpeting CMBS loan
programs in the second quarter. The rates offered on those programs, however,
are high, as are the credit standards. Were coming back on
the CMBS side, but nowhere near like we did in 2007, said Kieran Quinn,
president and CEO of Column Financial. 2007 was a bubble of unprecedented
times, but now were back to the old days. Those old
days were characterized by conservative spreads and underwriting, in contrast
to the fullterm interest-only (IO) periods, low debt-service coverage ratios (DSCRs),
and leverage routinely reaching above 80 percent that were common features at
the CMBS markets height. Despite the return to historical norms,
the CMBS markets recovery might take some time. Moodys Investors Service
is forecasting only $35 billion in CMBS issuance this year, down almost $200 billion
from the record $230 billion issued in 2007. Conduit originations for CMBS fell
96 percent in the first three months of the year compared to last years
first quarter, according to the Mortgage Bankers Associations quarterly
survey. That was the lowest level of issuance since 2001. In retrospect,
perhaps U.S. CMBS should be viewed as a $50 billion to $100 billion per year business
that spiked to $200 billion during a credit bubble, rather than a $200 billion
business having an off year, said Nick Levidy, a managing director at Moodys,
in a report. In todays capital markets, where debt is increasingly
harder to come by, a CMBS recovery would help restore the flow of capital to multifamily
developers. To revive conduit lending, several things need to happen at the same
time. Conduit lenders must be willing to originate new loans with strong underwriting.
Wall Street investors must also be willing to buy those loans once the debt is
packaged as CMBS. And investors must be willing to pay prices high enough to support
competitive interest rates. The lenders are willing Conduit
lenders began to emerge from the shadows in the second quarter. UBS issued
a term sheet for its commercial real estate conduit lending operation in May,
the first time it was able to do so this year. KeyBank Real Estate Capital is
exploring a new program to originate small-balance conduit loans and eventually
bundle them into CMBS. And Wells Fargo continues to originate conduit loansin-
waiting, or loans that it will hold on its books until the market recovers
and they can be securitized. Clearly, people are starting to see
the light at the end of the tunnel, and its not a train, said Dan
Smith, managing director at RBC Capital Markets. People are now saying when
and not if the market comes back, and thats a very positive
development. Like many conduit lenders, RBC hedged its bets when
the CMBS market tanked, and began originating loans through Fannie Mae. The company
originated about $2.5 billion in U.S. commercial mortgages for securitization
from 2006 through 2007. Now RBC is closely eyeing the markets recovery
and is poised to jump back in when it does. Weve kept our origination
team intact, and were positioned to come back to the market, said
Smith. I just need to see some more positive trends. Meanwhile,
Column hopes to originate enough conduit loans to allow a CMBS issuance by the
end of the year. The sooner that happens, the better, according to Quinn.
I would love to get a deal done quickly so that people can see evidence
of the market clearing of conventional, well-underwritten, 2008 underwriting standards,
said Quinn. If we come to market with that, it will clear very quickly,
spreads will come down, and well start to rebuild the market. 
But the spreads are weak The rates offered on the Column and Goldman
Sachs programs, however, are more than 7 percent, uncompetitive with Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and life insurance companies. And the credit standards are much tighter
than they were at the markets height early last year. There
are some lenders talking about quoting deals, but we havent seen sponsors
ready to use it yet, said Paul Brindley, a senior managing director at Holliday
Fenoglio Fowler. Theres such a big gap between a life insurance or
bank deal at 6.25 percent, rather than a CMBS execution thats 7 or 7.5.
That gaps got to narrow. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac program
lenders were quoting all-in interest rates that were even lower, around 6 percent
for 10-year loans, in early June. Industry watchers say conduit lenders
must offer interest rates below 7 percent to remain competitive. At press time
Column came close, offering 10-year loans with interest rate spreads of about
250 to 275 basis points over swap rates, for an all-in rate of around 7.25 percent
to 7.5 percent. Columns underwriting standards have also gotten tougher
since the capital crisis. IO loans, in which borrowers paid only the loans
interest and none of the principal balance, were practically standard before the
credit crisis hit. Columns standard 10-year loans are now offered with full
amortization over a 30-year schedule, with a balloon payment at year 10.
Column asks for DSCRs of 1.25x or higher, and the loans only cover up to 75 percent
of a propertys value, compared to 80 percent before the crisis. In
contrast, Goldman Sachs began to offer five-year IO conduit loans in mid-May.
The firm balances this aggressive IO feature with tightened loan-to-value (LTV)
standards allowing it to lend only up to 70 percent of the value of a property.
Like Columns program, the rates are in the low- to mid-7 percent range.
Thats really the first big salvo from the conduit side, said
Phil Melton, an executive vice president with Grandbridge Real Estate Capital.
Goldmans five-year IO money is a great first step, and its the
product that right now has the most appeal for developers. Conduit
loans will likely see more interest initially from office, retail, and industrial
borrowers that dont have access to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Column has
confirmed that most of the interest in its program is coming from those other
sectors, but the company is hoping multifamily loans will make up about 20 percent
to 30 percent of its first new issuance. Demand returns for CMBS, slowly
Although the interest rates offered by conduits wont decline until the demand
for CMBS improves further, the price investors are willing to pay for the bonds
has already come a long way. Yields for AAA-rated, super-senior CMBS, which
decline as bond prices rise, were 140 basis points over swap rates in early June,
according to RBS Greenwich Capital. Thats down from more than 300 in March,
the worst month for CMBS so far. However, todays yields are still multiples
higher than before the credit crisis. For example, the bonds traded at a spread
below 30 basis points throughout 2006. The meltdown in the single-family
market sparked the explosion in CMBS yields. Beginning in the spring of 2007,
a string of hedge funds and high-yield investment vehicles suffered unsustainable
losses from investments in subprime mortgages. In June, Bear Stearns Asset Managements
two high-yield hedge funds failed to meet their margin calls. In the following
weeks, lenders seized most of the collateral and began to liquidate $3.8 billion
in assets from one of the funds. A glut of CMBS bonds hit the market. Prices
collapsed for tranches of CMBS, like BBB-rated bonds, perceived as being more
risky. Spreads rose from less than 100 basis points over swaps before the crisis
to more than 1,550 in March, according to RBS Greenwich Capital. CMBS issuers
like Greenwich responded by delaying issuing bonds, and holding loans on their
books instead. Other issuers resisted selling some tranches of CMBS, like BBBrated
bonds, at deep discounts. The overhang of unsold bonds and the fear of spreading
foreclosures made it difficult to value CMBS. That made yields on AAA-rated
CMBS more volatile, and they began swinging by as much as 100 basis points week
to week. Lenders hate that kind of volatility. Its difficult to set an interest
rate for a loan without a clear idea of what investors might pay for the CMBS
backed by that loan at issuance. Volatility pounded the CMBS markets despite low
foreclosures in the underlying loans, as investors bet against the securities.
The fundamentals on the marketplace are not being reflected in the volatility,
said Lee Cotton, past president of the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association
(CMSA) and a vice president at Centerline. If youre betting against
CMBS, youve probably made a mistake. CMBS defaults for multifamily
loans were at just 0.35 percent through April, according to ratings agency Fitch
Ratings, Ltd. Just 360 delinquencies have been recorded out of approximately 42,000
Fitchrated loans. Thats in stark contrast to the current 6.35 percent default
rate of single-family mortgages. Since March, the CMBS market has gradually
improved. Weve seen enough progress in the market, and we know itll
continue to progress, Quinn said. Spreads have come in enough, and
weve convinced the market that theyre not going to see the wholesale
defaults like in residential. The glut of unsold bonds also seems
to have cleared, even for BBBrated bonds. The last issuance that was done
by Merrill a week or two ago sold out at all levels, said Dottie Cunningham,
CEO of the CMSA, in early June. There is a demand for product from the investors.
CMBS issuers have cleared their books of old conduit loans waiting to be issued.
And forced sales of CMBS to meet margin calls are also over, according to CMBS
traders. The lists that we see now are sellers taking gains, said
Kent D. Born, CMSA president, not forced sales. If the calm
lasts, eventually traditional CMBS investors, like life companies and pension
funds, will return to buy the bonds. 
Altered market When the conduit lending business comes back, it
will look a little different. Prudential, which originated about $3.6 billion
in mortgages for the CMBS market last year, announced it will exit the market
altogether. The company posted pretax losses of $107 million for its CMBS business
in the first quarter. Our decision to exit was based on our conclusion
that the business case simply did not prove out, said Richard Carbone, Prudentials
chief financial officer, in a first-quarter conference call. And when the
market comes back, it will return with a higher degree of collaboration between
competitors. The next wave of CMBS issuances will likely be smaller deals that
feature loans originated from three or four partners. The days of originators
putting $1 billion of loans on their balance sheets awaiting securitization are
probably over. Since our competitors ultimately become our partners,
we need to be able to work together, said Smith. There will be smaller
deals, probably $1 billion to $1.5 billion, but theyll have three or four
partners. And new players are beginning to emerge. Freddie Mac is
working to help matters along with a new conduit programthough it wont
be ready for prime time until the beginning of 2009. Freddie Macs
Capital Markets Execution (CME) program, currently in a pilot stage, is offering
conduit loans with interest rates of just 6 percent, LTV ratios of up to 80 percent,
and DSCRs that stretch down to 1.15x. The program also allows borrowers to take
out supplemental financing after closing, providing unprecedented flexibility
to conduit borrowers. (For more on the CME program, see page 30.) Freddie
Mac hopes to have an issuance or two done by the end of the year. Theres
a lot of fear in the market right now. Our pilot will help provide confidence,
and that will start to bring some stability back in the market, said Mike
May, Freddie Macs executive vice president of multifamily sourcing. A
couple of other issuers will get some deals off, and that success will breed success. No
Conduit Bailout Needed
More conduit loans are going to get into trouble
over the next year. Foreclosures will increase, and the rate at which conduit
borrowers fall behind on their payments will soar by a factor of more than 60.
Thats the analysis from Larry Duggins, executive managing director of Centerline
Capital Group, who retired at the end of June. Hes in a position
to know: Centerline is a big investor in Bpiece commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS), putting it first in line to lose money from conduit foreclosures.
The next 12 months will put pressure on portfolios of conduit loans, said Duggins.
He expects the scarcity of financing to push the price of apartment properties
down and drive up capitalization rateswhich express the net operating income
of a property as a percentage of the sale priceby 75 to 100 basis points
overall over the next 18 months. As property owners lose their ability
to sell their way out of trouble, the share of conduit loans in delinquency will
rise from the current level of just 0.3 percent to near 2 percent, said Duggins.
For perspective, the last time delinquencies reached 2 percent was in 2003, a
year that went down in the record books as the biggest year ever for CMBS issuance,
until 2004 broke that record. Its something that the CMBS market
could handle, said Duggins. CMBS delinquencies are especially low considering
that the foreclosure process for a commercial property can take six months to
two years, meaning few of those loans in delinquency are likely to ever reach
foreclosure, said Duggins. Even so, Centerline has toughened its underwriting
standards. As a B-piece CMBS buyer, Centerline has the ability to demand that
issuers remove loans with weak underwriting from the pools of loans that back
CMBS. That forces issuers to hold the weak loans on their own books. Centerline
can take that step because without a Bpiece buyer to stand first in line to take
losses from defaults, no issuance of CMBS could go forward. The power to
kick loans out of CMBS pools makes B-piece investors the gatekeepers of conduit
loan underwriting. Centerline now insists on conservative underwriting, fewer
interest-only loans, lower leverage, and an end to risky underwriting of any kind
in the loan pools that it invests in. The market is screaming for
a more conservative approach, even though no one seems to have gotten burned over
defaults, said Charles Krawitz, senior vice president for KeyBank, a conduit
lender. Just because you got lucky doesnt mean people are going to
let you do it again. Bendix Anderson |